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This paper presents a genre-based, generalized threat taxonomy for cloud computing. Cloud computing provides 
numerous possibilities and challenges but the nature of cloud computing exposes the resources of a cloud 
architecture to a wide range of threats. Presently, many potential threats, represented as security concerns, are 
known in a general sense but they are not classified specifically in relation to cloud services delivery. Therefore 
security concerns need identification and assessment and presented in a consistent and hierarchical form. We 
posit that to approach the issue in this way allows for more effective enforcement and therefore better resilience 
in a cloud architecture. We further posit that failure to effectively identify threats will lead to lower levels of trust, 
effectiveness and performance. The generalized threat taxonomy provides researchers with a framework through 
which risk factors and threats may be identified; and related against an overall picture of threat patterns. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing has recently reached a level of general acceptance and is used as a means for deploying 
computing resources (Dahbur, Mohammad & Tarakji, 2011). Cloud computing is often delivered on a rental 
basis, implying that resources are exposed to the outside world and therefore open to attack from third parties. 
While the customers of a cloud computing service have little to worry about with infrastructure management 
(Akande, April & Belle, 2013), security threats are a major concern (Jaeger, Lin & Grimes, 2008). Therefore, 
security management is a key requirement in cloud computing (Gonzalez, Miers, Redıgolo, Simplıcio, Carvalho, 
Naslund & Pourzandi, 2012) and so it is important to explore and realize threats in a cloud computing 
environment.  
A cloud based infrastructure implies an adaptation of a distributed network to support operations. Any 
distributed network is prone to security issues where the failure of any element may open the whole network to 
security threats (Garcia-Morchon, Kuptsov, Gurtov & Wehrle, 2013). Network security challenges are a 
common problem for which security in computer networks remain a challenge (Yang & Lui, 2014). This 
suggests that cloud computing needs to give special attention to security and that challenges need to be defined 
and identified. In this paper we present a generalized threat taxonomy for cloud computing. A genre-based, high 
level categorization of threat families are taken into account for the threat taxonomy instead of specific threats. 
The taxonomy is developed by applying the intuitive methodology outlined by Nickerson, Varshney and 
Muntermann (2013).  
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The motivation to develop a threat taxonomy arises from a need to present threats in a rational form. To do this, 
we take a genre based approach rather than identifying specific threats. This ensures that any new threat that 
emerges satisfies general categories instead of developing a new taxonomy for each type of threat.  
First we discuss existing viewpoints on cloud threat taxonomy, then we present a generalized threat taxonomy 
and rationale. To justify the taxonomy, we consider five recent case studies that illustrate breaches and then the 
case studies are related to the taxonomy.  
2. CLOUD THREAT TAXONOMY  
This taxonomy is founded on the epistemological foundations of existing research. For example, Gonzalez et al. 
(2012) propose three viewpoints for considering threats: architecture, compliance and privacy. The security 
taxonomy for cloud computing proposed by Hashemi and Ardanaki (2012) considers four major categories: 
infrastructure, application, platform and administration. They then denote specific threats under each category. 
Grobauer, Walloschek and Stocker (2011) do not discuss a cloud threat taxonomy in a traditional structured 
approach, instead the authors concentrate on generic threats that are linked to cloud computing. The cloud 
computing threats listed by Lee (2012) categorises risks: responsibility ambiguity, protection inconsistency, 
evolutional risks, supplier lock-in, business discontinuity, license risks, bylaw conflicts, bad integration, 
hypervisor isolation failure, service unavailability, data unreliability, abuse of rights of the cloud service 
provider, shared environment and use of insecure APIs.  
Chou (2013) describes how the risks of the cloud model are to be considered from its deployment model as well 
as traditional network threats and data loss perspectives. The major threat categories proposed are resource 
abuse, data breaches and security attacks. Höfer and Karagiannis (2011) propose a tree-based taxonomy for 
cloud services that can be used to identify associated threats in each type of service.  
Addressing management issues, Cardoso and Simões (2012) note costs, benchmarks, change management, 
legislation, SLA, lack of interoperability, information retrieval, information localization, standardization, single 
point of failure, service availability and security issues as the major category of challenges for cloud computing. 
However, Rimal, Choi and Lumb (2010) argue that all kinds of taxonomy for cloud computing are developed 
from a vendor perspective with little or no concern for the consumer or enterprise IT perspective. 
Soares, Fernandes, Gomes, Freire and Inácio (2014) identify eight major threat categories for cloud computing: 
security issues identified by organizations, deployment and service delivery model security, software-related 
security issues, data storage and computational security issues, virtualization security issues, networking, web 
and hardware resource security issues, access and trust security issues. Singh and Shrivastava (2012) describe a 
threat taxonomy based on classes of participant in a cloud-based architecture: service users, service instances and 
cloud providers. The threats are further classified as six root categories: service-to-user, user-to-service, cloud-
to-service, service-to-cloud, cloud-to-user and user-to-cloud.  
Finally, Chraibi, Harroud and Maach (2013) address the technical aspects of cloud architectures to describe 
cloud security as five major categories: hardware components, virtual machine manager, guest operating 
systems, applications network and governance. 
We have taken these factors into account and assimilated them into a more generalised taxonomy that 
incorporates the factors along with artefacts that are produced for use in the cloud. 
3. CASE STUDIES 
This section presents six cases of where cloud services have been breached or taken offline. To justify the 
elements, the case studies are then mapped to the taxonomy.  
3.1 Case study 1 – Apple iCloud Breach 
Apple’s iCloud is a consumer level service that is often used to back up a user’s phones’ images, music, data and 
so on (Apple, 2014). During Labour Day weekend in 2014, celebrity photos that were obtained from Apple’s 
iCloud service were published by purported hackers (PCWorld, 2014). The hackers had gained unauthorized 
access to the contents of user accounts through the application of brute force password cracking. TechTimes 
(2014) and The Wall Street Journal (2014) report that Apple denied there was a security breach and categorised 
the event as a targeted attack. TechTimes (2014) adds that Apple reported the attack  as having been focussed 
some on specific user accounts (those of the celebrities) and that access was gained by the hackers working out 
the username, password and security question, therefore Apple says this is not an architecture wide breach on 
iCloud.  
3.2 Case study 2 – Sony Attack and Amazon Cloud 
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In April 2011, the online entertainment system of Sony Corp was attacked. It is claimed that Amazon’s cloud 
based web servers are used to launch the attack (Bloomberg, 2014). “Hackers using an alias signed up to rent a 
server through Amazon’s EC2 service and launched the attack from there... The development sheds light on how 
hackers used the so-called cloud to carry out the second-biggest online theft of personal information to date. The 
incursion, which compromised the personal accounts of more than 100 million Sony customers, was “a very 
carefully planned, very professional, highly sophisticated criminal cyber attack,” Sony has said… The hackers 
didn’t break into the Amazon servers... Rather, they signed up for the service just as a legitimate company 
would, using fake information.” (Bloomberg, 2011) 
Bloomberg (2011) states that Amazon is left open for anyone to use anonymously by opening an account. It is 
claimed that using cloud based web services has helped the hackers achieve anonymity. Besides, using a clpoud 
based architecture for password cracking by makes the cloud an attractive target (Bloomberg, 2011).  
3.3 Case study 3 – JP Morgan cloud server hack 
In 2014, 80 million JP Morgan account holders have their records accessed in a cloud related breach  (CNN, 
2014). Personal information like names, addresses, email addresses and phone numbers of 76 million users and 7 
million small businesses are accessed by the hackers. The bank claims that no account related information, 
account number user IDs or dates of birth is exposed to the hackers. The bank claims no unusual customer fraud 
is observed in the incident. Any user accessing the service, including websites and smartphone apps, are 
affected. Despite there being no evidence of fraudulent activity, JP Morgan stresses that the accessed 
information can still be abused by selling it to spammers (CNN, 2014). Computerworld (2014) reports that this 
incident as a cyber-attack though no "unusual" fraud is detected. 
3.4 Case study 4 – Dropbox 
The cloud storage provider Dropbox faces a cloud attack in mid-2011. The incident is described as a security 
nightmare scenario. The website is exposed and unprotected with a large number of customers’ sensitive 
personal data. The cloud storage provider serves 25 million customers who use the service to store their 
documents, photos, videos or other files. The system was unprotected for four hours and during the period 
visitors could gain access to any account by using any password. The company traded security for use of use by 
encrypting and decrypting data on its own servers and instead of using complex encryption keys users are 
provided with a simpler method for logging in with just a password (CNN, 2011).  
3.5 Case study 5 – SnapChat 
The chat and photo sharing application SnapChat is claimed to have its cloud servers hacked in October, 2014. 
The service provider’s phone app and/or its servers have supposedly been hacked. The service provider denies 
the claim and points to a third party vendor that reverse engineered an API to access and store users’ materials 
from the SnapChat server. Further, the third party app makes users non-compliant with SnapChat terms and 
conditions. Thus SnapChat users are victims of the third party and SnapChat servers have not been hacked 
(TheRegister.co.uk, 2014). 
3.6 Case study 6 – Spark 
Spark, the largest telecom vendor in New Zealand, experiences a major shutdown of its cloud servers in 
September 2014. This resulted in service unavailability of the vendor’s broadband service. The incident is the 
consequence of a cyber-attack. It is believed that the attack is the work of international cyber criminals who have 
installed malware onto users’ computers. The malware code provides the capability to launch a denial of service 
attack. The attack generated high volumes traffic to the vendor’s servers and resulted in service unavailability. 
The service provider clarifies that this is not a fault with its own network infrastructure but rather the issue 
affects the client terminals or platforms (Stuff.co.nz, 2014). 
4. GENERALIZED THREAT TAXONOMY 
The difficulty in distinguishing cloud and non-cloud threats in a cloud computing environment lies in the 
conceptual nature of ‘cloud computing’. The term refers to a generalized and holistic application of remote 
computing resources, either hard or soft, and as an encapsulating layer for all the technologies and approaches 
required for a tangible distributed, virtualized and homogenized computing environment. This implies that the 
challenges and threats that need to be considered for cloud computing do not essentially have to be cloud 
specific, or the security challenges that are purely cloud related. Since many kinds of technology can be used 
within the context of cloud computing, a generalized threat taxonomy is required to ensure that no security 
concerns are left out of the scope in strategic surveillance planning for a cloud computing architecture.  
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The genre-based generalized threat taxonomy for cloud computing (Figure 1) is defined as a high level 
categorization of the family of threats rather than providing low level detailing of actualized threats within each 
genre (such as those described in section 2). The holistic view of the generalized threat taxonomy ensures that 
major trends in security concerns are taken into account to potentially identify threats from facets out of which 
cloud computing security challenges may arise. If specific threats are considered and a categorization of threats 
are done with no hierarchical order then the threat taxonomy may not maintain internal coherence. Thus, the 
generalized threat taxonomy is hierarchical. 
Both qualitative and quantitative aspects of a computing environment may be applied in a cloud computing 
scenario where soft and hard factors of the parties involved in cloud computing are accounted for. The parties 
considered are cloud providers, cloud users and intermediary providers (for example, Internet or public 
infrastructure discussed later in this section).  
Cloud computing illustrates a computing approach that includes any kind of system and social setting, including 
socio-technical systems. Consequently both technological and human factors (for example regulations, policy, 
and user competence) are part of the greater picture from which challenges and security concerns for cloud 
computing may emerge. The social context includes social engineering, competence and compliance. Social 
engineering is an emerging threat in Internet and cloud computing (Krombholz, Hobel, Huber & Weippl, 2013) 
and that introduces security threats to confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of personal and confidential data 
(Thornburgh, 2004). Robling and Muller (2009) define social engineering as activities that manipulate people to 
gain unfair access to confidential and sensitive data. This in turn presents additional factors such as low levels of 
competence or lack of compliance that may provide opportunities for practices that facilitate social engineering 
attacks. 
The hierarchical categorization of the generalized threat taxonomy has ‘hard’ technological factors and ‘soft’ 
human factors as root categories. The proposed taxonomy is depicted in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Generalized, genre-based threat taxonomy for Cloud Computing 
 
4.1 Human Factors 
Human factors in this context can be thought of as the human-centric actions in a cloud infrastructure that may 
potentially introduce security risks in that respective cloud architecture. For example, a lack of effective 
governmental regulations may hinder cloud services development in a region or a lack of integrity of the 
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application of regulations may lead to unethical exploitation of cloud services. Other human factors associated 
with cloud threats include social engineering, poor levels of computer literacy or security awareness of cloud 
users, insufficient trust, and poor compliance to regulations and standards. For example, in the SnapChat case, 
users installed the third party app in order to get around the terms and conditions specified by SnapChat and to 
capture and store images. Ideally, SnapChat does not retain image data after a short time but the reality is that 
data are transferre through a network and so it exists on servers. The third party app effectively intercepted the 
data stream. Additionally, in the Spark case, the company blamed users who had downloaded and installed 
malware by opening infected email attachments. Often the users had no idea of what they had done. 
Any single cloud breach may incorporate a number of threats in the taxonomy. For example, the JP Morgan case 
introduces a concern that users’ personal information are stolen and while no further abuse is found, there is the 
potential for subsequent damages to occur when data are sold to criminals. Whether the reason is technological 
(computing services, cloud platform, virtualization, web service) or human factor (competence, social context) 
the issue of trust as a threat for the organization is highlighted.  
Service License Agreement (SLA) design and management are related to cloud security issues (Srinivasan, 
Sarukesi, Rodrigues, Manoj & Revathy, 2012). SLA misinterpretation is a major factor when issues arise, for 
example blindly accepting an SLA or not understanding the legal implications of the SLA by the end users 
provides opportunites for security breaches to manifest. SLA misinterpretation may be associated with the 
unexpected consequences of actions and therefore situations that are not in line with business strategy. Thus the 
consequences can present risks and threats to the business and monitoring SLA’s is important (Emeakaroha, 
Netto, Calheiros, Brandic, Buyya & Rose 2012). While Sun, Singh and Hussain (2012) say that the SLA 
provides assurance against security risks from SLA violation we add that SLA provisioning is important, we also 
say that sufficient research is required because violation is linked to security threats (Casalicchio and Silvestri, 
2013).  
Gonzalez et al. (2012) and Guo, Sun, Chang, Sun & Wang (2011) say that trust is linked to security concerns 
and that as a concept, it comes from the social sciences. Khan and Mullahi (2010) say that a user keeps trust with 
a cloud provider through consistent practices of control, ownership and security. Trust is normally held by the 
cloud services consumer and so the choice for the consumer is whether to place their trust in the provider. This is 
a matter of perception and is not technology dependent. Also, the strength of trust for cloud service providers in 
any region is largely dependent on the integrity, scope and dependability of relevant regulations and policies set 
and enforced by regulatory authorities. While cloud services consumers are required to have trust in cloud 
providers when they store their personal data (Roberts & Al-Hamdani, 2011), security and trust management 
remain as one of the major challenges in cloud computing (Noor, Sheng, Zeadally & Yu, 2013). The opportunity 
to breach the defenses of a service provider presents a new threat, that is loss of trust. Case study four, the 
DropBox example, provides an illustration of how trust can be affected from the lowering of the perception of 
the integrity of a cloud architecture from a breach. This case study is also provides a view about lack of 
competence when designing the security mechanism or forecasting potential threats. 
Of the six cases presented, some incidents are not attacks on cloud architecture. In several cases, it is not easy to 
identify those responsible for the attack. This may reflect a lack of regulation or compliance of standards in 
cloud service provisioning and management. Apple is one such example, the claim is made that specific user 
accounts are targeted and accessed using brute force techniques, thus not all Apple users were affected. Apple 
provides robust security but in this case, it is the users’ weak passwords, lack of vigilance, for example, not 
locking the phone or leaving an unlocked phone unattended.  
Either the fault lies with human or technological factors. If there is no architecture-wide attack, then users may 
have just cause to blame the cloud service provider. However, this may link to a misinterpretation of the SLA, 
despite of the fact that such incidents may emerge as a consequence of human factors such as competence and 
social context.  
4.2 Technological Factors 
Technological factors refers to threats that fall outside the human factor categories, which generally means 
threats associated with technological practices and deployment. Technological factors are subdivided into 
hardware and software related threats. The hardware related threats normally arise from the cloud infrastructure 
and the network (for example the Internet) through which cloud resources are accessed. Software based threats 
emerge from operating environments, tools, applications or services available. These include both the cloud 
providers’ servers and the services consumers’ devices. Thus software and platforms (for example operating 
systems and Virtual Machine management systems) are the major sources of software based threats.  
The Internet is a significant factor in cloud computing because it is the primary means of access to remote cloud 
based resources. Internet protocols have their own set of vulnerabilities that the cloud computing inherits due to 
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its heavy reliance on Internet technology (Grobauer, Walloschek & Stocker, 2011). When it comes to software 
based security concerns, virtualization comes into focus because virtualization is widely used in cloud server 
deployment and comes with known vulnerabilities (Perez-Botero, Szefer & Lee, 2013). Therefore virtualization 
is identified as a threat category.   
Web based services are a popular means of accessing computing functions. Since web based sessions can have 
numerous known security challenges, web services are noted as a threat. This is something that Spark 
experiences on a daily basis but the case referred to provides an example of how a targetted attack can overcome 
services. Additionally, Grobauer, Walloschek and Stocker (2011) argue that virtualization, web services, and 
application and cryptography are associated with either intrinsic or prevalent vulnerabilities. The Sony incident 
brings not only technological factors into context, but also human factors where one organization becomes 
vulnerable while using the cloud architecture provided by another.  
As a consequence of the ingenuity of those who would breach the security of systems, an equally wide range of 
security mechanisms have been established over time. For example, cryptography is incorporated as part of 
security mechanisms in computing applications to prevent security breaches (Fan & Huang, 2013). Additionally, 
mobile computing is now widely used as a service (Chow, Jakobsson, Masuoka, Molina, Niu, Shi & Song, 2010) 
both with and without cloud based services. The SnapChat example provides stark evidence of what goes wrong 
when lax security is employed, albeit in this case that the third party software developer acted outside the terms 
and conditions of the company. With the concept of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), mobile computing is 
experiencing increased integration in cloud computing environments (Krombholz et al., 2013). Thus, mobile 
computing specific threats need to be addressed.  
Hardware based security concerns normally emerge from infrastructure and its maintenance. Various computing 
and maintenance services for example, unless a robust monitoring system is in place that includes incident 
response and routine maintenance, then the opportunity is provided for a person (insider or outsider) to attempt 
an intrusion. Also, the internal infrastructure of a cloud architecture presents a number of potential security 
weaknesses. For example, failure or malfunctioning of hardware may lead to overall inconsistency in the 
infrastructure. The external network always provides a threat simply because it is a ‘public place’ where security 
is not guaranteed. However, norms associated with the real life analogy of the public place do not apply in the 
case of computer and communication networks because external computing and communication networks do not 
necessarily adhere to political boundaries. So the robustness of the ‘public place’ is determined by collective 
global standards.  In the case of mobile computing, these issues are highlighted where the public infrastructure is 
the usual means for connectivity. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Cloud computing provides opportunities and challenges as it is increasingly embedded into computing 
operations. Opportunities progressively reveal themselves and as they emerge, so do challenges and so it is 
important to acknowledge and contextualize challenges. If security concerns in cloud computing are not 
addressed sufficiently, the consequences may be severe. A top down generalized threat taxonomy for cloud 
computing provides the context for identifying, acknowledging and addressing threats. Such a taxonomy ensures 
safer cloud computing practice and that major trends are not left out of scope when developing a robust and 
integrated surveillance strategy. 
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